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facts in arriving at its decision, and misapplied the law
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that the rule as to "undisclosed principal" does not
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POINT 1.
THE COURT MISINTERPRETED THE FACTS.
POINT 2.
THAT PLAINTIFF MADE NO ELECTION IN LOWER
COURT.
POINT 3.
COSTELLO VS. KASTLER DISTINGUISHABLE.
POINT 4.
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2
PRINCIPAL" DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY WHERE REAL
ESTATE BROKER AND SALESl\iAN ARE INVOLVED IN
TRANSACTION.
POINT 5.
THE RIGHT TO CLAIM AN ELECTION IS WAIVED
BY FAILURE TO DEMAND AN ELECTION IN LOWER
COURT.
POINT 6.
THE QUESTION OF "ELECTION" CANNOT BE RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
POINT 7.
IF THE FOREGOING ARE NOT PERSUASIVE, THEN
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOW BE GIVEN THE RIGHT
TO "ELECT" TO PROCEED AS TO KETCHUM.
POINT 8.
ASSUMING THAT STEVENS HAD NOT RECEIVED
PAYMENT, BUT HAD COMPLETED THE DEAL, AND
THEN SENT KETCHUM ALL PAPERS, COULD KETCHUM
RECOVER COMMISSION ON SALE?

Appellant feels that the 'Court did not give sufficient
consideration to these basic facts :
·Plaintiff had dealt with Stevens before in the sale
of the same property, while he was salesman for Gaddis.
This transaction went through without problems. She
dealt with him as salesman here, and not as an individual.
Stevens did exactly what Ketchum hired him to do,
find and bring together seller and buyer, get papers
signed, so as to collect a commission.
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3
At all times Stevens was a licensed real estate salesman working under Ketchum as broker. Ketchum hired
him, obtanied his license, and vouched for his integrity.
Paintiff, in good faith, paid Stevens $468.32:.
Plaintiff, of all three, was the innocent party.
Stevens admittedly was a thief and a scoundrel, and
absconded with the money.
Ketchum hired him, Ketchum vouched for him in
obtaining his license, Ketchum made it possible for him
to go forth armed with a license, bearing the seal of the
great state of Utah, to accomplish his theft or embezzlement.
Plaintiff was certainly the innocent party, who
under Judge Ellett's decision, and this Court's decision,
was made the victim.
The judgment granted against Stevens is ce-rtainly
a worthless piece of paper, he is apparently judgment
proof and out of this Court's jurisdiction.
Plaintiff has never had her day in 'Court, the matter
having be·en determined at p·re-trial.
The substance of the case so far as justice is concerned is that our Courts say to Brokers, "Hire who you
please, we will not hold you responsible, unless the victim
can prove you knew all about it." To a real estate salesman, the Court says "We support you in your skulldugge-ry, steal if you can, we will give judgment against
you. But if the custorner wants to hold your broker, he
must 'elect' the broker, and turn you loose."
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To the· innocent party - "Sorry, you should have
been more cautious, and it was your duty in dealing with
a licensed salesman, to demand to know his broker, and
deal with the broker."
The foregoing js not intended to question the 'Court's
integrity or ability, but an effort on Appellant's attorney
to forcefully· draw to the ·Court's attention the unfairness
of the ruling.
POINT 1.
THE COURT MISINTERPRETED THE FACTS.

Quoting from the decision, "She took judgment
against Stevens, and the lower Court dismissed the
action a.s to Ketchum. The Plaintiff chose to retain heT
judgment against Stevens, but appealed to this Court,
seeking to charge Ketchum also.
The record shows that Stevens filed a general denial
September 19, 1963. On February 10, 1964, his attorney
Vernon ·J. Langlois, filed his "\vithdrawal. On May 29,
1964, made a minute entry, as to Stevens "Answer
stricken, PI. given judgment as prayed." :The judgment
as to Stevens "\vas prepared by Tygesen, and signed by
Judge Ellett, June 30, 1964. One month after the judgment was signed as to Ketchum.
The judgment as to Ketchum, dismissing the case,
was prepared by Draper, and signed by Judge Ellett
June 1, 1964. At the request of Plaintiff, "FINDINGS"
were prepared by Dr a peT and signed by Judge Ellett,
June 8, 1964.
The pre-trial occurred l\{ay 29, 1964. Stevens nor
his attorney did not appear. The Court made its ruling
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as to Ketchum. Later that day, Judge Ellett, in order
to complete the case, made its minute entry as to ~Stevens.
The disposition as to Ketchum was made first, the
one as to Stevens, an afterthought. The decision would
infer judgment was first had as to Stevens.
The question of an ~'ELE'C.T'ION" was never raised
in the lower Court, and the statement in the opinion
"Such an election has been made in this case," as a
matter of fact never occurred.
No election was ever made by Plaintiff, and the
question was never considered in the lower 'Court, nor
did Judge Ellett make his decision on that point.
POINT 2.
THAT PLAINTIFF MADE NO ELECTION IN LOWER
COURT.

All during the proceedings, pleadings, memorandums, brief, and argument before this Court, Plaintiff
proceeded on the theory that both principal and agent
were liable.
All of D,efendant Ketchum's pleadings, interrogatories, briefs, "Findings" and "decree" related to the
point that P1aintiff did not rely on Ketchum, and Ketchum had no knowledge.
Not once did there appear a demand for an election,
nor that an election had been made.
POINT 3.
COSTELLO VS. KASTLER DISTINGUISHABLE.

In the Costello case, the agent was actually a buyer
of minerals for processing mill. There was no way
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Plaintiff could have known of agency, there was no
statute involved.
The ~Costello case relies heavily on 118 A.L.R. 682,
which was a case where the owner transferred his stock
on the books to the agent's name. Here there was a clear
intent to keep the principal secret. The third party in
making an investigation could not have ascertained the
principal-agent relation.
In the Costello case, the ·Court cites LOVE VS. s:T.
JOSE.PH STO~CK YARDS, et al, 169 Pacific 9·51. In
that case the agent was acting as agent for ~Stock yards,
but did not reveal principal. The Plaintiff had no way
of discovering the principal.
POINT 4.
THAT REAL ESTATE BROKER STATUTE ESTABLISHES PRINCIPAL AND AGENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BROKER AND SALESMAN, AND "UNDISCLOSED
PRINCIPAL" DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY WHERE REAL
ESTATE BROKER AND SALESMAN ARE INVOLVED IN
TRANSACTION.

Plaintiff's position is that the point as to "UNDISCL·OS~ED: PRINiCIPAlL?' should not apply to any transaction where real estate Broker and real estate sales-man
are parties, since that statute as to real estate brokers
must be read into each of such transactions, and by that
statute, principal and agent relationship is established,
and there can he no such thing as an undisclosed principal. In our case, there was no effort to conceal from
Wilkerson the relationship with Ketchum and Stevens.
Had ·Stevens attempted to conceal the relationship·, it
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was a public record at the State Capitol, Ketchum's
office displayed Stevens' license, every county clerk was
furnished a report showing Stevens was agent for Ketchum and Stevens held a card issued by the State of
Utah,' with their seal thereon embossed, declaring
Stevens was an agent or salesman for Ketchum.
How can the rule of "UNDISiCLO·SED· PRINCIpAL" be involved in view of these facts. It is not
possible to have an "undisclosed principal" under Utah
Real Estate Broker statute.
Wilkerson certainly dealt with Stevens as a "salestnan" even though she never knew about Ketchum. In
view of that relationship, then the provisions of the
Utah R.eal estate brokers statute must be read into these
proceedings. The whole purpose of that statute is to
protect the public, and to hold broker and salesman
equally responsible to the public.

61-2.-1 provides that it is unlawful to operate without
a license.
61.-2-5 that Securities commiSSion be given extensive power and control over brokers and salesmen. It
requires that brokers vouch for salesmen's integrity,
and the broker must furnish bond, to protect the public.
The statute does not require a salesman bond. Presumably the legislature intended to hold the broker as
the responsible party.
61-2-7 provides that after they a.re satisfied as to
the salesman's qualifications and honPsty, that they issue
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him a license, with their seal attached, and the broker is
given a similar license to be displayed in his office.
61-2-8 provides that if the salesman's employment is
terminated, the broker must immediately notify the
"'Commission," return the license they hold, and the
salesman cannot thereafter sell. Nor can a salesman be
employed by more than one broker at a time.

61-2-9. To further effect control over brokers and
salesmen, this section provides the licenses must be renewed each year. If the broker loses his license, then
all salesmen, licensed under him, immediately lose their
licenses.
61-2.-10 provides that a salesman cannot accept a
commission, except from his employer, the broker. Again
stressing the control of broker over salesman. This
section uses the word "unlawful".
61-2-11 lists grounds for revocation. Included are
( 4) actjng for more than one broker; (5) failing to account for money coming into his possession; (9) failing
to furnish all parties with copies of papers drawn; (10)
keep records for three years ; (11) failure to make full
disclosure, including undisclosed principal. (Incidently,
Stevens apparently violated every provision.)
61-2-14 requires conunission to prepare and mail to
all county clerks, serni-annually, a list of brokers and
salesmen, and furnish a copy to anyone, on request.
61-2'-17 provides for penalties including fine and
jail.
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61-~-20

says a salesman can fill out all forms, including receipts. If the salesman can issue a receipt,
presumably he would be entitled to receive money.
In view of the extended nature of this statute it
seerns apparent a broker and salesman are one, and the
broker by this statute is responsible for his salesman's
conduct.
With all the provisions to make public the relation
of broker and salesman, it seems inconceivable that the
question of "undisclosed principal'' can be factually a
part of any contract wherein either salesman or broker
are parties. It is not possible to conceal the relationship
of principal and agent.
In the annotations to 118 A.L.R. 682, at page 684,
this appears, "(15) Everyone in a state is bound to know
the existence and terms of a general law of the state."
The general law is made part of every contract. At page
705, the Court said all parties are charged with knowledge of the statute.
At page 696 the ·Court said that a principal and
agent ~'constitute but one party to the contract."
It is Appellant's contention that there can be no
such thing as an "undisclosed principal'' under the Utah
real estate broker statute, and to so hold, means that
the Court must entirely ignore the intent and purpose
of the statute.
This Court should properly hold, that there can be
no such thing as an "undisclosed principal'' as far a~
broker and salesman are concerned.
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POINT 5.
THE RIGHT TO CLAIM AN ELECTION IS WAIVED
BY FAILURE TO DE~/.fAND AN ELECTION IN LOWER
COURT.

All through this proceeding, Plaintiff proceeded on
th~ theory she could have judgment against both broker
and salesman, but limited to one recovery.
Defendant Ketchum in his AnsweT, interrogatory,
memorandum of authorities, argument before Judge
Jeppson, and before Judge Ellett at pre-trial, based his
entire defense on no knowled~e on the part of Ketchum,
and no reliance on Ketchum, and agent acted beyond the
scope of his authority. In D·efendant Ketchum's Answer,
'·'Fourth Defense" he alleges that Ketchum had no knowledge of the deal; that Ketchum did not participate; that
Stevens acted in his own behalf; that Stevens acted
beyond the scope of his authority.
The Ketchum affidavit in support of motion for
summary judgment in paragraph 3, stated that :Stevens
did not list the transaction with Ketchum, and at 5, that
St.evens was acting in his O"\Vn behalf. Ketchum's
"M.emorandum" furnished Judge Jeppson, stated that at
no time was Ketchum discl<;>sed, discussed, or relied
upon. Quoting . from that memorandum, first page~
"ISS·UE'" "Whether or not a principal whose identity
is undisclosed and not reiled upon is liable for the acts
of its agent not within the scope of his authority and
actng in his own behalf."
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The memorandum is directed entirely to this issue,
and "election" is never mentioned, nor is the Costello
case cited.
In the judgment prepared by Draper, the basis is on
lack of knowledge by Ketchum, no disclosure, discussion
or reliance on Ketchum, and that Stevens acted on his
own. There was not one word as to "election". In the
Hfindings" later prepared by Draper at the request of
Plaintiff, and signed by Judge Ellett, (2) Stevens acted
on his own, without knowledge of Ketchum. (3) At no
time was Ketchum disclosed or relied upon by Plaintiff,
nor did Ketchum participate in the transaction.
Again, not one word in relation to "election".
The principal of the ~Costello case as to "election"
was first introduced in Ketchum's respondents brief.
Judge Ellett signed the "Findings" and "judgment"
as prepared. Presumably they reflect his basis for the
decision. There was not one word in either of these
documents, suggesting an "election". At no time in all
these proceedings was there a discussion, suggestion,
request, or demand for an "election".
Plaintiff's Counsel admits ignorance of the Costello
case, until it was pointed out in Respondent's brief.
Plaintiff contends that (1) The failure to demand
an election in the lower Court, waived that right; and
(2) The question of election, cannot be raised for thP
first time on appeal.
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This Court apparently bottoins its decision on Costello vs. Kastler, 7 Utah 2nd 310; 324 Pacific 2nd 772,
which in turn, relies heavily on 118 A.L.R. 682.
Appellant draws the ·Court's attention to these
points from those two cases :
In the 'Costello case at page 773, the Court said,
"Ordinariy Plaintiff would not he entitled to judgment
against both. However, App·ellants did not demand or
move for an election by Respondents, as to whether the
principal or agent should be held and the failure to do
so was a waiver."
In the A.L.R. case, John D. Hospelhorn, Receiver,
et al vs. Philip L. Poe, et al, Maryandl :Court of Appeals,
April 21, 1938, 118 A.L.R. 682 ,after pointing out the
principal and agent could be joined as parties D'efendant,
in the annotations at page 705, it state, "If both Defendants ate found to be liable . . . then the Court should
direct an election be made and enter judgment accordingly."
At page 707, this appears, "If he sues both, however,
the only remedy of Defendants is by motion to compel
him to ele-ct." At the same page, "B. Waiver of right to
compel election." ''It has been held that the rule that
the Plaintiff before the· close of the case must elect
whether he will take judgment against the one or the
other is subject to an exception, or modification, which
holds that the right to compel an election is waived by
failure to demand or Inove for that remedy during the
eourse of the trial." (A California case)
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Again at page 707, also a ·C·alifornia decision, this is
stated, "'So, where ... judgment is entered against them
jointly, ... \vithout raising the question of an election
by demurrer, motion, demand, or otherwise the right to
compel an election is thereby waived and may not be
raised for the first time on appeal."
In a New York decision, this is quoted at page 707708, "Where Plaintiff sues both . . . where Plaintiff's
1notion for judgment on the pleadings against the agent
was granted by the trial Court at the opening of the
trial, the principal could have then insisted that Plaintiff
had made an election binding on him to hold the agent
only, and a motion for dismissal of the complaint as
against the remaining Defendant, if made, must have
been granted; however, the Appellate ;Court was of the
opinion that no such motion was made, either then or
thereafter, and no request made that the ~Court so hold,
the point was waived."
Plaintiff submits, the question of "election" was
never raised in the lower Court.
POINT 6.
THE QUESTION OF "ELECTION" CANNOT BE RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

The rule has long been established, that a p·oint cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. ~The Court
reiterates that position in the ,c·ostello case, and aga1n
in the A.L.R. case at page 707, see above quote.
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POINT 7.
IF THE FOREGOING ARE NOT PERSUASIVE, THEN
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOW BE GIVEN THE RIGHT
TO "ELECT" TO PROCEED AS TO KETCHUM.

If any or all of the above is not persuasive, then
Plaintiff requests the privilege to now dismiss the worthless judgment against Stevens, and proceed to trial as
to Ketchum.
Plaintiff's counsel wishes to point out, the Costello
case was not familiar to him until presented on appeal.
·Certainly had we been obliged to elect in the lower Court,
we would not have elected Stevens, who was out of the
jurisdiction and judgment proof. We were never asked
to elect. We took the Stevens judgment to clear the case
for appeal.
The current decision says, "She took judgment
against ·Stevens, and the lower Court dismissed the action as to Ketchum." Again, in the last line of the decision, ". . . the complainant 1nust make an election as to
which he chooses to hold responsible. Such an election
has been made in this case."
Plaintiff contends that the record shows judgment
was given as to Ketchum first, and a month later the
judgment was signed as to Stevens. 'The inference from
the opinion was judgment was first given as to Stevens.
Plaintiff further contends that in view of the above
cases, that to the Court's ruling here that Plaintiff must
elect, should be added the words, if de1nand is so made.
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Plaintiff further contends that no demand was ever
made, nor did she ever make an election.
In the Costello case, no election was made, and on
appeal, this Court said at page 773, "Since the respondent in his brief has stated that if the ~Court should find
that he is not entitled to judgment against both appellants then he requests that he be allowed to make his
election in this 1Court and chooses to hold the agent
Kastler. We deem it proper to grant the request." At
page 777, the Court said, "Affirmed with instructions
to vacate the judgment against appellant lTranium
Chemical Corporation."
In the A..L.R.. case, annotations, page 708, a Texas
decision, this is stated, "Judgment as to both. Both could
not be held." And then this, "It was further held that
the Plaintiff would in the appellate Court be allowed to
elect to hold the agent and dismiss as to the principal,
that the Court stating that this right should be accorded
for two reasons ; in the first place the record showed the
Plaintiff was entitled to judgment against either De.fendant he might choose to hold, and not having been
theretofore called upon to make his election, he should
be pe-rmitted now to do so; ... ".
1

If elect we must, then we ask permission now to
elect Ketchum.
POINT 8.
ASSUMING THAT STEVENS HAD NOT RECEIVED
PAYMENT, BUT HAD COMPLETED THE DEAL, AND
THEN SENT KETCHUM ALL PAPERS, COULD KETCHUM
RECOVER COMMISSION ON SALE?
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This question is posed, since it has bothered Plaintiff's counsel all during the proceedings. Judge 'C'rockett
broaches the same, in saying that if the principal, though
undisclosed, received the benefits, he could be held jointly with the salesman.
Put another way, suppose Stevens, acting clearly
within the scope of his authority, obtained a buyer for
Plaintiff, all papers signed and deal closed. Ketchum
was never mentioned. Then Stevens sends all documents
to Ketchum, who learns about it for the first time. His
agent has performed the service, the broker is entitled
undeT the statute to sue for the commission.
How far would Wilkerson get, in a defense of undisclosed principal~ It seems to Plaintiff to he a two
way street. If undisclosed principal could recover commission, when apprised of facts, then Wilkerson in turn
should recover from undisclosed principal.

1. 'That the rule of "undisclosed principal" has no
application where a licensed broker and a licensed salesman are involve-d in the transaction
2. That the right to have an election made, was
neveT demanded, and therefor waived.
3. !The question of an election cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.
4. That the Court should pass upon the issues
raised in Plaintiff's brief as to the liability of Ketchum
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as principal, and the 1natter sent back to determine that
liability, and give Plaintiff her day in ~Court.
5. In a final alternate, that Plaintiff be peTmitted
novv to elect to proceed aganst Ketchum, dismiss her
judgrnent as to Stevens, and the matter returned to the
lovver court for determination of Ketchum's liability.
Respectfully submitted,

ROY F. TYGE·SON
Attorney for Appellant
2968 South 86.50 West, Magna
P.O. Box 206, Phone 297-6711

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

